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The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to
Tragedies of the Commons
Bruce Yandle* and Andrew P. Morriss**
The authors propose a framework for analyzing the broad
class of problems that fall within the "tragedy of the commons,"
the dominant metaphor for understanding environmental
problems. The Article applies industrial organization theory to the
issue of how to solve tragedies of the commons, developing a
conceptual analysis built around the various forms of property
rights (common, public, private, regulatory) used. It then examines
how technology affects the appropriateness of different solutions.
Finally, the Article expands the notion of technology to include the
legal institutions that implement the various forms of property,
uncovering an important set of incentive effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Garrett Hardin's classic description of the tragedy of the
commons' tells us that all environmental problems require a
property rights solution. The property solution or rule may call
for the definition and enforcement of common, public, or private
property rights, but any escape from the tragedy requires some
rationing mechanism that allocates a form of property rights to
some entity. These solutions fall into one of two broad traditions
within economics: the Pigouvian, or regulatory tradition,2 and
the Coasean,3 or market-based tradition.4 Any proposal for
action in either tradition implies some definition of property
rights.' The difference lies in the type of property rights required.
If the recommendation follows the Pigouvian tradition, it will call
for government taxation or regulation, and the politically
determined rules will form a public or regulatory property
regime.6 A recommendation in the Coasean tradition, on the
1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCd. 1243 (1968).
2. The Pigouvian tradition, which calls for the state to intervene by imposing
taxes or regulation on pollution as a way to achieve some politically determined
standard, comes from the seminal work of A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
(1920).
3. The Coasean tradition is based on the seminal work by R. H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase's analysis is an attack on the
Pigouvian position and calls for a greater reliance on private property rights and
markets than does Pigou.
4. See generally Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou, and Environmental Rights, in WHO
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 119 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds.. 1998).
5. Of course, enduring a tragedy by doing nothing can be the low-cost solution.
Doing so allocates the property rights to the polluter,
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other hand, will rely on markets and a system of private property
rights to solve the tragedy.7
Defining property rights is central to solving any tragedy of
the commons. Thus, understanding the factors that influence
how property rights are defined is critical to understanding the
solutions to environmental problems. In this Article, we propose
a framework for examining how technology influences the
definition of property rights. This framework, depicted in Figure
1, clarifies the differences between Coasean and Pigouvian
solutions to commons problems and assists with the choice
between them.
Technologies that reduce transaction costs allow individuals
to engage in increased wealth-increasing trades. When such
technologies allow the creation of private property rights,
entrepreneurs facilitate the creation of new bundles of property
rights to meet the demand for property. Such entrepreneurs can
play an important role in delivering environmental goods.
At the same time, equally powerful incentives exist for
individuals to use the power of government to capture property
rights. Such rent-seeking disrupts the entrepreneurial process
and prevents the development of new solutions to new problems.
Our theory helps explain how these two conflicting impulses
shape the provision of environmental goods.
6. The basic blueprint followed by the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act calls
for command-and-control regulation, implying government definition of public or
regulatory property. The blueprint is consistent with the Pigouvian tradition. A more
detailed description of regulatory property is given in Carol M. Rose, The Several
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems,
83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 164-65 (1998). See also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 799
(1999].
7. Recent developments in the Clean Air Act that define allowable amounts of
sulfur dioxide emissions from specified electricity generating plants and then allow
for permit trading among plants begin to incorporate the Coasean idea. The definition
of constrained and tradeable property rights to pollute encourages the polluter to find
low-cost solutions to the pollution reduction problem. Another example of a Coasean
solution to an environmental problem can be found by looking at how the United
Kingdom protects fisheries by giving private fisherman the right to sue. Common law
suits brought by angling clubs against polluters comes even closer to the property
rights ideal described by Coase. See Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling Assoc. v.
British Celanese L.D., 1953 Ch. 149; see also Roger Bate, Protecting English and
Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers' Conservation Association, in THE COMMON LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL







Regulatory restrictions on the use of private e sl
property are created Rgltr etitosaeefnatc
In Part 1, we describe the role of technology in defining
possible property rights solutions. Part II utilizes a theory from
industrial organization to build a conceptual model of how
property rights evolve.' In Part II, we discuss various kinds of
transaction costs that affect the evolutionary process and show
how property rights technologies address these costs. In Part III,
we discuss two competing legal frameworks for solving commons
problems, the common law and statutory law. Finally, Part IV
discusses certain aspects of the competition between providers of
property rights institutions and explains how this competition
affects the resulting definition and distribution of property
rights.
8. See infra note 31 and associated text (developing parallels with the theory of
the firm).
[Vol. 28:123
TECHNOLOGIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
I
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS
A. Property Rights Technology
Property, at least as taught in most American law schools,
concerns itself with a great deal of historical detail on the origins
of the basic concepts of Anglo-American property law arising out
of the struggles between the landed aristocracy of England and
assorted monarchs.9 Modem land law, for example, has its
genesis in William the Conqueror's desire to keep the Norman
overlords he installed in England loyal to him.'0 To speak of
'property rights technology" may, therefore, seem odd.
Yet William was a "technological" innovator, and many
consequences of his innovations are still with us. Like any
innovator, William created a new method of achieving his goals.
Like many innovations, William's construction of the beginnings
of Anglo-American property law had consequences that he could
not foresee. Nonetheless, thinking about law as a technology has
important conceptual advantages- it allows us to bring to bear
the established body of economic analysis of technological
change to help explain legal change and its consequences. The
separation of the legal interests in property from the physical
object possessed has enabled us to constantly modify the set of
property rights that constitutes "ownership" of land (or anything
else). Property rights are affected by a variety of technologies.
They include physical world technologies of the type traditionally
associated with technology such as barbed wire, which made
private property rights cheaper to enforce across the Great
Plains, property rights technologies such as those explored in
this section, and legal technologies- namely common law and
statutory law- considered in detail in Part IV.
The common metaphor for Anglo-American property rights is
helpful here: generations of law students have wrestled with the
notion that property interests are best represented by a bundle
of sticks. Particular rights- the right to harvest timber or to
cross a particular piece of land- represent individual sticks;
9. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998),
which begins its section on possessory estates with the following sentence: "In
January 1066, Edward the Confessor, saintly and celibate, died childless." IcL at 187.
10. A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAw 3 (2nd ed. 1986) ("The invasion
of England by a band of military adventurers made it necessary to quarter this
military aristocracy on the conquered land: William had to reward his followers and
preserve his military strength for the future.").
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various rights holders have bundles of varying composition with
respect to particular parcels of land.
The technology of property rights can be understood by
thinking about this bundle of sticks. Technology, either in law or
in a more conventional sense, allows increasingly sophisticated
definitions of property rights and allocation of particular sticks
to either private property owners or public entities. Registration
of deeds is a comparatively recent property rights technological
innovation from 1640,11 and it allows certainty of title- enabling
complex financial dealings based on land as collateral. Once
created, however, its use evolved in unanticipated ways as
individuals sought to fulfill their own plans and projects. The
technology of deed registries allows this to occur despite its
origins in other needs of the society that created it. For example,
patents and copyrights allow the creation of new forms of
property. To take another example, changes in water law
allowing water rights owners to leave water in streams instead of
requiring out-of-stream use create new types of water rights. 2
Each of these innovations added sticks to the bundles of rights
held by property owners. Conversely, zoning laws removed sticks
from property owners' bundles by regulating previously
unrestricted land. The invention of aircraft also led to the erosion
of the traditional common law maxim cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelun, which translates as whose is the soil, his is to
the sky or high heavens.'3 Thus, the ultimate impact of these
innovations on property rights cannot be foreseen- the order
that results is unplanned.
While the impact of particular technologies is generally
unpredictable, the effects of technology on property rights can be
classified into several different categories. First, technology can
affect what rights can be placed into the bundles of sticks. Thus
a legal change or scientific innovation may place something
within the category of things that may be owned or may remove
it from that category. For example, the invention of the harpoon
made it possible to convert whales from unowned to owned
property. The property right to dead whales might be lodged in
the harpoon thrower, the town nearest where the whale washed
ashore, or the public in general- the point being that ownership
11. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 9, at 651 ("Public recording of
deeds, mortgages, leases, and other instruments affecting land title began in this
country in the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies around 1640. It was not
an English custom.").
12. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRo-CAPITALIsTs 89-107 (1997).
13. RALPHE. BOYER. SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 258 (3rd ed. 1981).
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of the whale could now be assigned. Live whales remained
beyond the effective reach of the property rights bundle. 4
Owning a whale therefore required killing it. Recent advances in
GPS technology and DNA fingerprinting, however, may soon
make it feasible to own live whales, substantially changing the
feasible set of property rights in whales."5
Second, technology can make it possible to subdivide
property rights within a particular bundle in new ways. The
innovation of the fee tail estate, for example, made it possible to
create a new temporal division of land ownership." Likewise, the
development of the trust enabled the division of the legal and
equitable interests in property, making it possible to "break"
particular sticks into new pieces.17
Third, technology may make different forms of property
possible. Generally, property falls into five broad categories:
1. The Commons: property which is available to all
mankind: the atmosphere is an example of a commons;
2. Common Property: property which is available to a
particular group but not to outsiders: a family's living
room is an example of common property;
3. Public Property: property controlled by government, such
as a national park:
4. Private Property: property controlled by private entities,
such as a fee simple absolute ownership in land; and
5. Regulatory Property: a property right created and
allocated by a government entity, such as a right to emit
specified pollutants into the atmosphere under the terms
of a permit issued by a government regulator. 18
Technology affects which of these kinds of property are possible
with respect to any given stick from the bundle.
14. Of course, one can always assign a property right in theory. We could, for
example, claim to own Mars, but such a claim is mere speculation without the ability
to enforce it.
15. See Richard S. Cahoon & Ron Herring, Biotechnology, Intellectual Property,
'Bioproperty' and Novel Schemes for Wild Biota Conservation, in THE TECHNOLOGY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill eds., forthcoming 2001).
16. See SIMPSON, supra note 10, at 85.
17. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 9, at 275 ("The trust, a brilliant
invention of English jurisprudence, is an extremely flexible form of property
management.').
18. There is a long running debate over whether or not private property
ultimately depends on the government's enforcement mechanisms for its existence.
We need not resolve that issue here; it suffices to note that regulatory property must
be allocated by a government while private property need not be.
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B. The Paths out of the Commons
Consider the archetype of the commons problem: Garrett
Hardin's description of a pasture into which anyone may place
as many cattle as she sees fit. 19 Because no one can restrict
others' rights to the commons, overstocking soon results from
individually rational behavior. Each individual cattle owner
bears only a portion of the costs her cattle impose on society, yet
she reaps all the benefits of her cattle. The cattle owner's
decisions thus do not take into account that adding cattle will
reduce the productivity of the pasture for others.
Escape from this tragedy is possible by transforming the
commons into any of the other four forms of property, although
the route chosen has important consequences that we will
explore shortly. The local village could convert the commons into
common property, regulating the number of cattle by linking the
right to own cattle to the amount of land owned in the
community. (This was, in fact, how medieval English villages
escaped the tragedy Hardin described.) The pasture could also
be made public property in the form of a park, thus allowing
cattle to be banned from the pasture. (The United States used
this strategy in creating Yellowstone National Park.20 ) The
commons could also be privatized by granting or selling a portion
to individual owners. (The Homestead Act did this with respect to
large areas in the United States. 21 ) Finally, the government could
issue a limited number of grazing permits to control the number
of cattle allowed into the pasture. (Public land grazing permits in
the western United States fall into this category. 22) Many
different property rights paths can resolve the problem of the
commons.
In describing the private property rights route of escape from
the commons, most accounts of the evolution of property rights
19. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. For a description of the modem version of the
same practice, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 58-102 (1990). See also
Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in
the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 581, 650-78 (1998) (describing
the methods used to overcome commons problems among western cattlemen).
20. On the formation of Yellowstone National Park and the "national park idea,"
see AUBREY L. HAINES, THE YELLOWSTONE STORY: A HISTORY OF OUR FIRST NATIONAL
PARK 156-73 (revised ed. 1996).
21. On homesteading, see Richard L. Stroup, Buying Misery with Federal Land,
57 PUB. CHOICE 69 (1988); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property
Rights, 33 J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990).
22. For a summary of the rules governing grazing on federal land in a property
rights context, see Leigh Raymond, Are Grazing Rights on Public Land a Form of
Private Property?, 50 J. RANGE MGMT. 431 (1997).
[Vol. 28:123
TECHNOLOGIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
focus on "demand thresholds" or the points at which, with a
given technology, it becomes profitable to define a new private
property right. In these accounts, broadly described transaction
costs are at issue and entrepreneurs claim, define, trade, and
are held accountable for certain rights to a former common-
access resource." According to this model, the process begins
when the common-access resource is made more valuable by
growing demand. As demand increases, the potential profits from
defining private property rights bring the common access
resource to the threshold at which it is worth incurring the
transaction costs necessary to define rights. But for the private
property rights threshold to be approached, cost-effective
technologies for measuring, monitoring, and enclosing private
property must emerge so that identifiable units of the resource
can be claimed and transferred. Once such technologies are in
place, the threshold crossing may occur, provided the associated
wealth distribution effects are successfully resolved.24 Having
sufficient gains from trade to cover market-related costs is
necessary but not sufficient. Side payments may also be required
to satisfy those interested in maintaining the status quo. Where
either private property rights technology is lacking or the
distributional cost hurdle is too high, private property rights
cannot emerge because the transaction cost wedge is simply too
large. Political or regulatory property rights will emerge instead.
Among environmental property rights historians, the free
market environmentalism school focuses most on the
importance of private property rights technologies.25  The
development of barbed wire dramatically demonstrates how
technology affects the development of private property rights.6
Consider the salient parts of the barbed wire story. With the
introduction of barbed wire, it became possible to divide and
enclose large amounts of open range grazing land at significantly
23. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A
Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2nd ed. 1997); Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a
Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource. 13 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1970);
Harold Densetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 17 AM. EcON. REv. 347 (1967);
MICHAEL DE ALESSI, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS (1998); GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); OSTROM. supra note 19; Carol M. Rose, Energy and
Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261
(1990).
24. LIBECAP, supra note 23, at 11-12.
25. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 23; TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL,
FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991); DE ALESSI, supra note 23; LIBECAP, supra
note 23, at 10.
26. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 25, at 24-34.
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lower costs than before barbed wire. Ranchers could enforce
exclusive rights to vast sections of western territory, resulting in
enhanced stress on the grazing land; as cattle production
increased, grazing land became more valuable. At the same time,
however, the prior technology for enforcing property rights in
cattle- cowboys and horses- declined in value as demand for
the "old technology" decreased. Just as rising demand for
transportation allowed the automobile to replace the horse and
carriage and so doomed buggy whip manufacturers and
blacksmiths, so barbed wire reduced demand for horses and
cowboys.
The economist's reliable model of the firm operating within a
competitive industry can explain this result: at the time barbed
wire was introduced, there was a growing demand for the
capability to enclose and exclude. The foregone gains from trade
were large. As demand for private property rights grew and the
cost of enforcing such rights remained constant, the potential for
gain by reducing enforcement costs expanded. Creative people
observed the opportunity for profit and barbed wire was born.
This stylized form of the story omits a critical element from
the model- an institutional arrangement that accommodates
the market process. The legal institutions that conditioned and
affected the definition and enforcement of private property rights
need to be explicitly considered. For the barbed wire story to
hold, the cattlemen occupying western land must first be able to
exercise the right to enclose the land." This was not always the
case for western cattlemen; indeed, their enthusiasm for barbed
wire enclosures led them to fence off illegally at least thirty-six
million acres of U.S. government land.
28
For land to be enclosed and alienated and barbed wire sold,
a technology must exist for measuring and recording land, as
well as for producing barbed wire. Then for the story to lead to
full land-value maximization, the cattlemen must hold a
recognized right to alienate the land. As residual claimants,
owners of rights that can be defined, defended, and devised to
others, the holders of private property rights in land have the
incentive to search for and install barbed wire. If enforcement of
these rights is lacking, however, the market for barbed wire will
be severely limited: there will be little barbed wire, other than in
museums or in engineering laboratories.
27. See LIBECAP, supra note 23, at 60-64.
28. Id. at 64.
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Thus, the commons-to-private-property story is incomplete.
Some means of allocating and recording rangeland was
necessary to account for the technological development of barbed
wire. Several competing providers of these institutional services
were available. At one extreme, the resource in question could be
controlled and managed by government. Statutory law and
regulation administered by civil servants can develop a system of
regulatory property rights that solves a problem of the commons.
At the other end of the spectrum, fully alienable rights to the
resource may be held exclusively by private parties, administered
through common law, contracts, and voluntary exchange. Thus,
the development and implementation of property rights
technologies will be significantly determined by which
institutional provider is dominant.2 9
II
THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
We can begin to unpack the black box of property rights by
using the economic theory developed to explain the allocation of
transactions between firms and markets. Economic theory has
often treated the internal workings of firms as a "black box"
impenetrable to the theory's insights. Similarly, legal scholars
have often treated property rights institutions as equivalent
black boxes. Economic theory requires more than knowledge of
supply and demand to explain why some transactions occur
within firms outside of the marketplace while others occur
between firms in the marketplace. 0 Similarly, explaining how
particular sticks in the bundle end up defined as private
property, public property, or regulatory property requires
examination of more than the demand thresholds considered in
the usual evolution of property rights story.
To unpack the black box of the firms, George Stigler turned
to one of Adam Smith's insights, rephrased as a theorem of
industrial organization, to explain how specialized activities
29. See Andrew P. Morriss, Law on Range (unpublished working paper, 1999) (on
file with author) (discussing differences in rangeland allocation practices between
Texas, where cattlemen procured private property rights to land, and Wyoming.
where cattlemen where unable to do so because of federal land policies).
30, Understanding why, for example, auto manufacturers purchase some parts
in the marketplace but create others in house requires understanding more than the
prices and quantities of the various parts. The industrial relations analysis of
General Motors' relationship with Fisher Body is the classic in this field and is still
provoking profitable analysis today. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher
Body by General Motors (2000).
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within firms can sometimes become firms themselves and why
they do not do so in all cases. Noting that the "division of labor is
limited to the extent of the market," Stigler developed a theory of
vertical integration and disintegration. 31 This "division of labor"
model is consistent with the demand threshold concept of
property rights evolution discussed previously. By applying
Stigler's model to property rights evolution, it is possible to find
similar effects that can be termed a "division of property rights"
model. Thinking of ownership as a bundle of potential rights, we
can readily see that where demand for particular rights is weak,
some specialized rights might not be unbundled and traded in
the market, just as some functions within a firm awaiting growth
in demand for a specialized service might remain integrated. For
example, mineral rights might remain attached to the land
package until the time that the expected value of the ore
removed rises sufficiently to justify their unbundling. Similarly,
the right to discharge particular waste materials in a river might
go unmarketed until the benefits of unbundling those specialized
rights exceeds the cost of building the related institution. Thus,
we see that the division of property rights is limited to/by the
extent of the market.
From at least John Locke on, property rights theorists have
assumed that all of nature was initially a commons.32 At some
point, however, parts of the commons became sufficiently scarce
that it became economical to define, unbundle, and protect those
parts of the commons as common property. Then, with further
increases in demand and encounters with scarcity, efficient
behavior dictated further unbundling of specialized rights.
Eventually, the unbundling process led to private property
rights. As Yoram Barzel argues, "property rights are constantly
created and abandoned" as economic conditions change.3 3
The notion of property rights specialization is illustrated in
Figure 1, which gives a highly stylized property rights flow
diagram for a generic resource.' The evolutionary path of
property rights formation begins with a commons. The path then
leads to common property as a group (tribe, clan, and nation),
which defines itself and limits access to common property to its
31. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 129-41 (1968).
32. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 29 (Thomas J. Peardon ed.,
1952) (1690) ("Thus in the beginning all the world was America.").
33. BARZEL, supra note 23, at 90 (emphasis in original).
34. Of course, particular resources may follow different paths out of the
commons. The path illustrated here Is intended largely as an example, not as a
definitive description of how property rights develop for every resource.
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members. As the group develops more formal government
structures (a king), property is reallocated from the collective to
the ruler(s) and becomes public property. At that point, a fork is
encountered where either fully defined, protected, and alienable
private property rights emerge, or some form of regulatory
property is defined and maintained by government. The arrows
in the figure indicate the general direction followed as economic
and other social forces stimulate the evolutionary process.
Understanding why particular forms of property rights arise in a
particular case requires examining the components of the
property rights definition process.
A. Unbundling
Unbundling is a vital component of the process of property
rights evolution. All of the paths out of the tragedy of the
commons require creating and allocating some new stick or
sticks in a property rights bundle. Although the paths differ in
what they require to create and allocate a stick, each path
involves some combination of defining, defending, and enabling
transferability of property rights. The costs associated with these
paths vary and property rights may be redefined multiple times
for the same piece of land as property rights evolve, for example
from public to private property or from public to regulatory
property. An examination of this evolution, as depicted in Figure
1, shows that the degree of openness in the property rights
system first contracts as property is taken out of the commons,
then expands and contracts again."5
The unbundling process is thus made up of three activities:
defining, defending, and enabling rights to be transferred or
devised. These activities, in turn, contain elements of fixed and
variable cost. Defining property has a high fixed cost element.
For example, defining property rights in land may require that
the land be surveyed and the dimensions marked and recorded;
water flows and interactions with pollution be mapped using
geographic information systems; 36 or stack emission monitors
installed for measuring environmental uses. In contrast, costs
35. Property in a commons is "open access" to those able to use the commons-
that is, the users are able to make decisions about using the property without regard
to others. As property moves from the commons to private property, the degree of
openness contracts: if it then shifts to regulatory property, the degree of openness
expands again.
36. See Clay J. Landry, The Role of Geographic Information Systems in Water
Rights Management, in THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 15.
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associated with defending or transferring property rights are
variable. The interaction of fixed and variable costs generates a
set of short-run cost curves much like those in any standard
economic text. The result is an upward-sloping supply curve that
represents the cost of property rights definition, transfer, and
defense. Thus, different forms of property will present different
mixes of fixed and variable costs in each of these areas, and the
relative costs will dictate the form that property rights take.
Technological change alters these relative costs and can change
the form of property rights under conditions we explore in the
next section.
The level of precision necessary for defining, defending, and
enabling transferability of property rights varies with the form of
property created; therefore, so does the relative cost associated
with creating such rights. Creating fully alienable private
property requires the most precision: a right must be created
that can be measured and described with sufficient precision to
allow its transfer. Public property generally requires the least
precision, if only because it is by nature untransferable and so
any precision required for transfer can be safely ignored.
Regulatory property generally falls between the two, with the
degree of precision dictated by the particulars of each case.
Consider, for example, the choice of how to allocate a tract of
land. If the land is to be given to private property owners, the
boundaries of each tract must be defined, a means of defense of
the boundaries provided (fences, trespass suits etc.), and the
incidents of a market guaranteed (at a minimum, bans on force
and fraud). If the land is to be made into public property, as a
park, the overall boundaries must be delineated and rules for
use of the park created and enforced. Providing private entities
with a means of defense and guaranteeing the conditions
necessary for a market are not necessary. If the land is to be
made regulatory property, through grazing permits for example,
the rights associated with the permits must be defined and
defended.
History and tradition tell us that once a resource makes the
transition from common access and becomes the exclusive
property of a tribe, family, or political unit, the process is seldom
totally reversed.37 So long as the once common-access resource
37. This is not always the case, however. In the barbed wire story, horses that
were a valuable property rights technology used in defining and defending property
rights in pre-barbed wired days were displaced by wire and released to the wild to
become public property. In some cases, the horses and their progeny became
common-access resources; they were not worth the cost of protecting them. See Terry
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has sufficient value to justify relatively low marginal cost border
protection, the resource will at least remain in the public
domain. However, Figure l's double arrows, between common
property and public property and between public and private or
regulatory property, indicate that property rights previously
defined and enforced at a rather detailed level can and do return
to common property or public domain status."
There are distributional effects associated with a change in
property rights status. Movement from common property to
private or regulatory property simultaneously creates and
destroys property rights. These rights can range from the classic
"sole dominion" characteristic of single ownership in fee simple
absolute to ownership vested in a closed group, which might be
called voice.39 For example, when rights to a resource are held in
common by an identifiable group, membership is a prerequisite
for sharing the common resource. Access to fisheries, grazing
range, hunting territories, even swimming areas is frequently
managed by club-like organizations having specified membership
requirements. 40 Membership in the property system may be
tightly closed,4 ' and, depending on the group decision rule, each
member has some voice in determining the arrangement for
sharing or transferring units of the resource. Even if direct voice
is lacking, each member of the group has well-founded
expectations for sharing in the benefits of the common property.
Of course, the group's identity can be so elastic that the
nominally closed system is really open for all practical purposes,
such as agreements under which tribal lands may be available to
all members of the Cherokee nation or all persons of Germanic
descent. In either case, the number of parties is unknowable and
the related property claims are practically unlimited.
All else being equal, the rising transaction costs that
accompany the need to obtain agreement from an expanded or
open-ended set of claimants to a property right diminish the
prospects for gains from trade. Alienability and openness are
L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, From Free Grass to Fences, in MANAGING THE COMMONS
119-34 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 2nd ed. 1998).
38. The common property and public property distinction is ancient. Bracton, or
Henry of Bratton, used this characterization of water rights In the mid-thirteenth
century, as did another English treatise of unknown authorship. See T. E. Lauer, The
Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963).
39. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
40. See generally James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
ECONOMICA 1 (1965).




inversely related. Fewer transactions will be observed in more
open groups. If a private association or club formed for
managing common property expands its membership beyond the
limits that provide expected gains on average for each member, it
is possible for a move to public property to be viewed by existing
club members as wealth increasing. They may favor public
sector management, hoping to obtain a meaningful output
restriction or larger share at lower cost. At the same time,
movement from common to public property can dilute the value
of rights (or voice) held by a smaller defined group within the
polity while expanding group membership to include all citizens.
There are, again, distributional tradeoffs that follow from this.
Consider a person who is not a member of the common
property group. If he can obtain citizenship at a lower cost than
group membership, then movement to public property opens the
system for that person, along with all other citizens. Rights (or
voice) are created for that person as he participates in the shared
use of the resource but shares are diminished for each member
of the former common property group. We observe this with the
demise of tribal fishing rights for Native Americans in the Pacific
Northwest that accompanied the arrival of the new American
citizens.42 For all parties taken together, new and old, the
expected transaction costs for contracting increases; the
previous Native American market process suffers. The incentive
to conserve the resource is replaced by an incentive to exploit the
resource. Thus, enforcement costs rise with openness.
Figure 1 implies that as property rights evolve, the degree of
openness first contracts and then expands and contracts again.
In the process, wealth is created, destroyed, and redistributed.
Different types of property rights technology emerge along the
way. A transition from public to private property rights by
definition produces a closed system.4 3 All rights are allocated; to
participate in the use of the resource, an individual must obtain
rights from some private right holder. There is one-to-one
mapping between the number of rights and right holders. If the
rights in question are fully alienable, any change in ownership
requires unanimous agreement. In other words, any individual
owner has unilateral powers to transfer his rights to another
agreeing party. By comparison, movement from public property
to regulatory property along the other path partially reopens the
42. See Robert Higgs, Legally Induced Techntcal Regress in the Washington
Salmon Fishery, 7 RES. IN ECON. HIsT. 55 (1982).
43. See Holdemess, supra note 41.
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system relative to private property, but does so by political
means; to use the resource, the qualifying individual must be
favored politically or satisfy regulatory requirements that ration
use. The rule of unanimity is generally broken; voting rules of
less than unanimity and competition among special interest
groups for political favors affect outcomes.
B. Transaction Costs and Property Rights Technologies
Transaction costs provide a crucial piece of the explanation
of why particular forms of property rights arise. In a world
without such costs, the process of defining particular sticks in
the property rights bundle would produce an optimal bundle
regardless of the initial conditions. In a world like ours, however,
where transactions costs play a significant role, the form of
property rights that emerges may be heavily influenced by the
magnitude and placement of such costs. Thus, factors affecting
the magnitude of transaction costs have a large impact on the
emergence of particular property rights. Changes in property
rights technology can alter the mix of costs associated with
defining, defending, and enabling transferability as well as the
relative magnitudes of the various cost generators. The previous
section illustrated that different forms of property will present
different mixes of fixed and variable costs in each of these areas.
The relative costs, based on a particular property rights
technology, will then dictate the form property rights take. This
section will show that technological change alters these relative
costs and so can change the form of property rights.
Again, analogizing to Stigler's theory of industrial
organization is useful. Stigler examines the case where two firms
can achieve gains from trade but are prevented from doing so
because the price of one firm's product is fixed by regulators.'
He notes that by combining into one firm, thereby removing the
transaction from the market and thus from the regulator's
control, the firms can capture the gains from trade that are
impossible in the marketplace.4 5 The transaction costs of
defining a property right may play an analogous role. Assume
that we are considering the demand and supply for rights to in-
stream flows in a particular river location. Assume also that if
property rights are defined for in-stream flows, then market
supply and demand analysis would produce trades at an




equilibrium price defined by the intersection point of the supply
and demand curves. But if the right to in-stream flows is not
currently defmed as an alienable "stick" in the water rights
bundle, then some level of positive transaction costs associated
with defining it will prevent the attainment of the zero
transaction cost equilibrium. The payment or sharing of
transaction costs by market participants (those with the right to
in-stream flow and those who want to purchase the rights to
such flows) will ration the available goods in the market and
absorb part of the theoretical gains from trade. Obviously, if
transaction costs are zero, the quantity transacted in the market
will expand to the traditional equilibrium point. In the extreme,
when transaction costs are sufficiently high, however, there will
be no transactions. (We must keep in mind, however, that the
asset may still be used in wealth-creating ways even though
there are no observed transactions or trade.)
Several kinds of transaction costs affect the choice among
types of property rights. One important class of transaction costs
relates to measuring and monitoring the items transferred
among trading parties. Where the ability to define, defend, and
therefore, monitor such transfers is lacking, alienability and
gains from trade cannot be obtained, and contracts cannot be
enforced. Therefore, insufficient technology will result in a closed
system where the bundle of private property rights still exists,
but no transfers of certain sticks in the bundle will be
observed.46 In these cases, the desired right, which cannot be
unbundled, can be obtained only by acquiring the entire bundle
of rights to which it belongs.
A second important class of transaction costs is those
associated with gaining agreement among those who share
property rights. At one extreme, the sole owner of a fee simple
absolute needs to "discuss" her actions only with herself. At the
other, gaining the agreement of a large group of individuals who
each possess a veto may make transactions costs prohibitively
high.47 Thus, while defining and defending may be feasible, the
rising transaction costs associated with gaining agreement to
move from an open to a closed system may eliminate the
prospects for individual ownership and trade. For example, it is
46. Examples of this include rights to in-stream flows in some locations, riparian
and some mineral rights that accompany land ownership, certain hunting, grazing,
and fishing rights that cannot be transferred from the certified Individual, and a
multitude of informal arrangements for sharing common property.
47. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticomnmons: Property in the
Transftionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621 11998).
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possible to measure and monitor the withdrawal of oil from the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, but, heretofore, gaining
agreement on changes in the terms and conditions for
withdrawal has been prohibitively costly.
Defining, defending, and gaining agreement involve three
aspects of property rights technology. For any type of property
right to exist, the resource itself must be identified and its
amount and quality measured. To defend the defined rights to
the resource, threats and harms must be identified and
measured. For rationing and exchange to take place, resource
activity must be monitored and recorded. These categories of
technology can include basic scientific knowledge about the
resource and threats to it, as well as meters, remote sensing and
recording devices, fences, brands, and identifying marks. The
third category, gaining agreement, generally involves the use of
some kind of two-way communications technology that provides
information, feedback, and recorded agreement or disagreement
between and among people who would normally transact with
each other. These technologies can be as simple and subtle as
council meetings where senior community members discuss
issues and reach agreement on resource use or a telephone call
between a broker and client where an agreement is made and a
contract formed. They can be as complex and costly as satellite
sensors that emit signals to interested parties who, viewing the
same data, make decisions in a virtual council meeting. Among
the technologies are some that are best suited for private
property protection and others that satisfy special regulatory
requirements.
Our investigation into the "black box" of property rights
technology thus reveals a second black box embedded within the
first: what physical-world technologies are available will
influence the availability of the different property rights
technologies in particular cases. The relationship goes both
ways, of course, as allowing those who can define a right to
withdraw it from the commons will create an incentive to create
the physical-world technology to claim the right.
C. The Fork in the Property Rights Path
The private/regulatory property fork in the path of property
rights evolution shown in Figure 1 is the focal point of any
discussion of evolving rights for environmental goods. This
junction is also where incentives for the development and use of
different categories of property rights technologies live or die.
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One might assert with little fear of contradiction that government
regulation of U.S. environmental goods is currently so
pronounced that there is hardly any activity along the private
property fork in the road. Is this the case because of
technological inability to measure, monitor, and enclose the
regulated property rights? Or, more cynically, has a regulatory
system become dominant because politicians have seized
opportunities to redistribute wealth?
There is evidence to support both cases. Quite possibly, the
absence of property rights technology provides the initial nudge
along the regulatory property route. Once regulatory property is
the norm, rent seeking and redistribution take over, making it
costly to deregulate and privatize.4 8 Holding the potential gains
from trade constant, there are currently few if any incentives to
develop the physical-world technologies necessary to develop
private property rights technologies once the regulatory path is
chosen. Without the potential customers for a new rights
technology offered by private property, entrepreneurs will not
invest in creating such technologies. Just as the demand for a
means to exclude others created the incentive for the invention
of barbed wire, so opportunities for entrepreneurs would
stimulate the production of new technologies to provide
environmental goods. The regulatory property path forecloses
such developments, however, by eliminating the opportunity to
profit from developing such technologies. We have separate
paths that generate path-specialized property rights
technologies- a path-dependent story. We can assign cost in
terms of foregone gains from trade to the degree of divergence
between the regulatory and private property paths. Cost may be
highest when regulation precludes totally the ability of resource
managers to make efficiency-enhancing adjustments in the use
and deployment of resources. That cost falls as flexibility enters
the regulatory process.
Consider the U.S. pollution control experience. The
regulatory/private property rights junction became meaningful
in 1970 for air quality and 1972 for water quality with the
passage of the fundamental national statutes.49 The two statutes
effectively nationalized the two environmental assets (air and
48. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 373 (David W. Pearce, ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (derming rent seeking as "the use of real resources in an attempt to
appropriate a surplus in the form of a rent.").
49. See A. Myrick Freeman Il1. Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT ISSUES
IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1978), see also ALLEN V.
KNEESE & CHARLEs L. SCHULTZE. POLLUTION, PRICES. AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
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water), embraced a technology-based command-and-control
regime, and ended a period of property rights history that relied
significantly on decentralized regulation, private property rights,
and market forces.
5 0
Early U.S. environmental regulation recognized the
magnitude of the regulatory task by using technology as the
monitoring mechanism. In effect, the federal government became
the new "landlord" of the nation's air and water resources, and
polluters became "tenants," renting rights to emit specified
pollutants. As landlord, the federal government did not measure
and monitor environmental quality directly. Instead, the
government established technology-based standards for broad
categories of production processes within specific industries.5 If
the standards were met, permits were issued. After issuing
permits, the regulator would check each user and determine if
the user was properly equipped. If so, it was assumed that the
outcome would be in the interest of the landlord. Since by
statute each discharge source had to be controlled by specified
technologies, there was no possibility for trade, even within the
confines of a particular plant. The incentive to discover private
property rights technologies was practically non-existent.
Effective law enforcement protects the value of the regulatory
rights and maintains output restrictions. While regulatory
property rights holders desire to minimize their own costs even
though they cannot trade, they want their competitors' activities
effectively monitored. A variety of technologies accomplish this,
including inspections, physical monitoring of locations where the
resource is used, and requirements that all parties provide
reports on the use of the resource being managed. Generally
speaking, however, the technologies for monitoring regulatory
compliance in a command-and-control regime are not suitable
for private property rights' protection and trade enhancement.
50. See Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental
Federalism: An Examination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM
225 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (discussing pre- and post-federal
period environmental regulation).
51. There was a "one suit fits all" aspect of this that imposed costs on all but the
"average" production process. The obvious economic hardship was the basis of E.I. du
Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), a water pollution control case
arguing that permits should be individualized. Siding with the U.S. EPA, the Court
agreed that the transaction costs of dealing with more than 42,000 dischargers made
it impossible for the agency to custom design permits and still meet the statutory
deadline. See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 286-87 (1995) (discussing E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.).
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We must recognize here a fundamental difference in
regulatory and private property rights. Regulatory property rights
are valuable because a government imposes a restriction that
must be satisfied. A permit to operate a plant is valuable. If
regulation goes away, however, the permit value evaporates.-2
Private property rights are valuable because of market forces,
which are supplemented by rules of law. The private property
rights enhance the value of an economic resource. If the
marketplace closes, as when the New York Stock Exchange
closes at the end of the day, the resource is still valuable.
Command-and-control regulation generates regulatory
property rights in the form of nontransferable government-issued
permits. Defining and defending such rights is the business of
the government, which is assisted in its task by regulated firms,
environmental organizations, and interested citizens.53 Under the
command-and-control regime, outcomes and environmental
conditions play second fiddle to pollution control inputs and the
appropriate use of technologies. With trade forbidden, no market
incentives exist to discover and apply new techniques for
monitoring, measuring, and legally packaging tradeable units of
pollution rights. Instead, they are simply driven to meet the
technological demands of regulators and to assure that these
demands are imposed on their competitors.
Whether operating in a common law or regulatory regime, to
obtain efficiency in environmental management, economic
agents must be allowed to truck and barter as they juggle access
to and use of environmental resources. Sometimes use of scarce
environmental assets requires ownership of particular land
parcels, membership in some specified community or tribe, or
citizenship in some political unit. At other times, access and use
is simply a matter of engaging in mutually beneficial exchange of
fee simple rights with rights holders. The degree to which
property rights can be alienated determines the wealth creation
potential for the resource in question. The limits of efficiency are
52. Taxicab medallions are a classic example of this phenomenon. In cities where
the taxicab business is regulated, only the owner of a taxi medallion is authorized to
operate a cab. In New York City, these medallions sell for more than $225,000. This
value is entirely dependent on the continued artificial scarcity caused by the
regulatory property regime. New York Cabbies Allege Exploitation, Plan Lawsuit, THE
TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2552516.
53. See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Do Liberalized Standing Rules
Advance Environmental Protection? (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.home.earthlink.net/-jhadler.
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found when defined and defended environmental rights can be
completely alienated.
Holding constant the demand for a bundle of environmental
rights, the supply of activities that define, defend, and divest
various sticks in the bundle or the entire bundle depends on the
technology of property rights definition and enforcement. Wealth
depends on the transferability of property rights. When the
ability to measure and subdivide parcels from a larger tract of
land is lacking, the asset owners cannot maximize the potential
value of the land. For example, if water flows cannot be metered
and water users billed, then water will not be provided by private
suppliers. Similarly, if particular emitters of harmful pollutants
cannot be distinguished from a host of similarly situated
potential emitters of the same pollutant, then the scope for
bargaining and use of rules of liability will be reduced.
Command-and-control will rule the day. Evolving property rights
technologies enable movement along the path from the commons
to private property.
D. Legal Technologies for Property Rights
At the time barbed wire was developing, there were two basic
forms of law in the United States: common law and statutory
law. The same is true today. These types of law differ in several
important ways and represent different systems for producing
innovations in property rights technology. The common law
emerges on a case-by-case basis from real controversies
adjudicated by common law judges.5 Common law evolves in a
small numbers setting. Through judges' use of precedent in
deciding cases, the law is generalized to large numbers of
parties. Statutory law, on the other hand, emerges in a large
numbers setting, but can be specialized so as to apply in
selected ways to smaller numbers of people and technically
specific situations. Note that the process through which the
common law generalizes rules to large numbers varies
considerably from the way statutory law solves the large number
problem. Statutory laws apply to a defined group from the
beginning; common law rules must be applied through
54. See JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WriTtEN AND THE UNWRITEN LAW
28 (1889); F. A. HAYEK, VOLUME 1: LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 94-97 (1973); BRUNO
LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 85-87 (3rd ed. 1991); Andrew P. Morriss, Codification
and Right Answers, 74 CHI-KENT L. REv. 355, 376-79 (1999); Yandle, supra note 4:
Todd J. Zywicki. Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv. 845 (1999).
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individual lawsuits.15 This represents both an important adaptive
mechanism- new facts can modify the rule- and an important
constraint on rent-seeking." The common law process is
continuous; an opportunity for the modification and introduction
of new knowledge is afforded each time a common law judge
writes an opinion. By contrast, the statutory law process is
sporadic. Statutes are written when the legislative body is in
session and when the political agenda calls for action. Finally,
potential authorship differs significantly. Any person who writes
a contract has written common law. Only politicians and
bureaucrats, however, can write statutory laws or regulations.
Now consider the market entry of barbed wire under two
distinct situations. Situation 1: If legal prohibitions are absent,
and if common law judges will enforce property lines defined by
barbed wire as well as by other methods, then cattlemen and
barbed wire producers have an incentive to pursue gains from
trade. Thus, the market process will be fully competitive.
Situation 2: If the legislative body, by statute, outlaws the use of
barbed wire, all bets are off. Or, if the legislative body establishes
a land management commission with delegated authority to
define and regulate the use of appropriate technologies for
enclosing land, then another set of incentives enters the picture.
In Situation 1, barbed wire sellers will expend resources in a
competitive process to gain the patronage of interested
cattlemen. In Situation 2, however, barbed wire entrepreneurs
must leap two hurdles- the invention, production, and
marketing of barbed wire and successful lobbying to obtain
regulatory approval of the use of barbed wire. Indeed, the
producers, or just one producer, may lobby successfully to have
barbed wire, or one patented type of wire, specified as the only
state-approved method for defining the borders of cattlemen's
property rights to rangeland.
The two market entry situations generate different
competitive and rent-seeking responses from barbed wire and
other enclosure system producers. Barbed wire may become an
approved enclosure device by way of custom or contract
(Situation 1), or by statute (Situation 2). In Situation 1, there is
no low cost way for individual barbed wire producers, or the
barbed wire industry at large, to affect a change in custom or to
55. Of course, class action suits are sometimes possible, which can apply a rule
of law to a large number of parties through a single decision.
56. If people must incur the costs of litigation each time they seek to enforce a
rule, they will "purchase" less rules enforcement, and so pursue fewer rents, than if
they are offered the economies of scale provided by legislation.
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influence the content of all land use contracts. There is also no
easy way for a special interest group to obtain favorable
outcomes from common law judges in cases involving the use of
barbed wire. The legislature and regulators provide low-cost
opportunities for favor seeking by individual barbed wire
producers, the barbed wire industry at large, and interest groups
because a statutory law can govern the whole land enclosure
system.
The barbed wire story illustrates several key distinctions
between the common law and statutory law. First, the
transactions costs are placed on different parties. Under the
common law, individuals are free to adopt innovations, legal or
otherwise, and anyone objecting to an innovation has the burden
of challenging it. Further, the ability to challenge innovation is
limited to those directly affected by the innovation- we cannot
challenge your contract with a third party, nor can you challenge
ours. Under the statutory law, however, the burden is on the
party seeking to legitimize the innovation. For example, if
boundaries may only be marked by approved fence types, the
individual seeking to use barbed wire (or a new type of barb)
must obtain an amendment to the statute (or administrative
regulation). (If this seems fanciful, consider the process a coal-
fired power plant must go through in order to adopt an
innovative form of emissions control that fulfills the Clean Air
Act's requirement of scrubbers.") Moreover, in the legislative and
administrative processes, third parties not only can, but are
encouraged to intervene.
Second, legal innovations are adopted through different
processes. In the common law, legal innovations emerge from the
facts of actual cases and the interactions of those facts with the
established system of rules. Creating a "new" variant on a rule
requires convincing not just one judge, but many judges that a
particular fact pattern requires a different solution. Bad ideas
must thus pass multiple hurdles. Statutory innovations, on the
other hand, are produced solely by convincing a majority of
legislators to act. The public choice literature amply documents
the broad class of problems this entails and illustrative examples
are legion.5 8 To take just one- Hollywood stars are regular
witnesses before legislative committees, but rarely appear in
57. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 15-21
(1981).
58. See generally id. (describing how eastern coal interests and environmental




court unless they are parties to a case.59 The common law is also
less likely to make large-scale errors because the pace of legal
innovation is more deliberate than the pace in a statutory
regime.
Third, statutory law carries with it a strong incentive for
continual government involvement. Agencies must implement,
monitor, and report back to legislatures. A "ratchet" effect occurs
with one intervention leading to more as the legislature corrects
unintended consequences and expands the scope of legislative
solutions. In the common law, by contrast, courts rarely
maintain an ongoing intervention into private litigants' affairs
after a decision has been made.
Fourth, Coasean bargaining around common law decisions
is possible. If you prevail against us in a nuisance case, we can
always purchase the contested right from you. If we persuade a
legislature to outlaw your behavior, however, you can no longer
buy us off as the "public interest" has now attached to the rule
in question.
IIl
DEFINING AND DEFENDING ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: BUILDING LEGAL FENCES
The path-dependent ° story helps explain how the particular
mix of property rights technologies that govern environmental
problems today developed. The rent-seeking portion of the story
explains why we are stuck there even in circumstances where
the potential gains from trade are large relative to the
transaction costs of a change. These stories do not, however,
explain how we might reap the gains from trade possible from a
shift to the private property rights fork in situations where gains
from trade exceed the transaction costs. In this section, we use
the evolution of water rights to explore how such a shift can
occur.
59. For what it is worth, movie stars appear to seek opportunities to appear
before Congress but shrink from appearing in lawsuits. To the extent we think being
a successful movie star is a bad proxy for having good ideas for government, the
common law process has an additional advantage.
60. Path dependence is an economic term meaning that the outcome depends on
where you start. Stan Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolls, Policy and Path Dependence
from Qwerty to Windows 95, 18 REGULATION 33, 33 (1995), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18n3d.htm (describing and exploring the
concept of path dependency).
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A. Evolving Property Rules for Quantity and Quality
Scientific discoveries play a crucial role in the definition and
protection of private property rights in general, and forming
markets for environmental rights in particular. Consider water
quantity and water quality, two distinctly different commodity
characteristics. If we start at the most basic level- for example,
the flow of water through an irrigation ditch- we can imagine
the relative ease with which early users could determine when
and where water flowed. Measuring the rate of flow and total
volume in a given time period is obviously more complex. For
water quantity, we would expect that crude rules based on first
occupancy would emerge initially. Then, as technological
sophistication increases, appropriative rights with a "use it or
lose it" condition might come next. Later, with improved
metering, we would expect to see a more sophisticated rule of
law that accommodates water transfer and markets. Indeed, this
scenario approximates the development of water law in the
United States.6'
By comparison, developing institutions for managing water
quality is far more daunting, if for no other reason than the
scope of qualitative dimensions that might be rationed. Consider
the problem of assuring the healthfulness of water for human
consumption. The capability of certifying healthfulness makes it
possible to expand the market for drinking water. This can be
seen in the proliferation of bottled water sales in developing
countries as well as in the United States. Other more costly ways
of assuring quality would prevail if the ability to measure and
certify were lacking. Consider the use of rivers for disposing of
waste. Being able to measure levels of dissolved oxygen makes it
possible to set related constraints and market consumption
rights.
Each characteristic in the water quality bundle that might be
scarce and valuable comes with a measurement challenge. Being
able to measure and meter does not necessarily solve the control
problem. In other words, the ability to measure the level of
dissolved oxygen in a stream does not translate into technology
for reducing the consumption of suspended oxygen. Without the
ability to meter and monitor, it would be impossible to know
when property rights were held, transferred, or taken. In the
absence of scientific knowledge, it would be impossible to move
beyond the stage where the mysterious nature of the
61. Rose, supra note 23, at 267-94.
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environment causes people to avoid risky encounters with
environmental use.
1. The Evolution of U.S. Water Rights
In her rich discussion of evolving U.S. water law, Carol M.
Rose describes what at first seems to be a puzzle.6 2 In the earlier
years of industrial development in both England and the eastern
United States, water in streams was valuable primarily for
providing motive power to mills. The issue was water quantity
and the rules of law and property were clear. First, the property
rights of ancient uses of streams were given priority at common
law. After that came the rule of first occupancy. 3 Generally
speaking, first occupancy meant the first owner to make a water-
dependent capital investment. Newcomers to streams
understood that they would have to bargain for water rights
already held by established users. The world was Coasean. 4 The
appropriative rights system in the western United States was
similarly well grounded. In both cases, measuring and
monitoring use was relatively easy.65 An impartial observer could
quickly determine if a stream was diverted away from a water
wheel or if an irrigation ditch was opened or closed. No special
legal machinery was needed to accommodate trades.
Rose's puzzle arises when accelerated economic development
in the eastern United States led to a revision in water law.
Leaving the relatively well-founded rule of first occupancy, the
law moved, not to a rule of prior appropriation like that which
developed in the arid West, but to a seemingly mushier doctrine
of reasonable use within a riparian system. What previously
looked a lot like a private property rights system became
common property in a multiple-user setting. But, as Rose
suggests, what appears to be a puzzle is really no puzzle at all.
Accelerated economic development resulted in the need to
simultaneously ration two attributes of water- physical supply
62. Id.
63. Id. at 273.
64. It is interesting to note that an identical system of water rights developed in
Japan in what is called Japanese Common Law. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Water Law in
Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51 (1989).
65. See Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law
for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Control Planning (2001) (manuscript
on file with author).
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and the quality of the water supplied.6 6 Physical volume could be
monitored and metered at low cost. Markets for rights to water
flows came with relative ease.
While water quantity could be monitored and metered at low
cost, water quality was another matter entirely, since each user's
activity could affect the level of quality available to all future
users. Use determined quality. When identifiable mines or farms
consume an acre-foot of water, the metered' water quantity is a
private good. When an acre-foot of water receives waste
discharge from multiple users, the resulting water quality is a
collective good. Lacking private ownership of in-stream water
quality, and lacking the technology to identify water quality
consumption, reasonable use became the rule of law. The
turning point came in the foundational water rights case, Palmer
v. Mulligan." Palmer, a downstream owner, complained about
water pollution and the interruption of water flow caused by an
upstream owner who had built a mill and dam that diverted logs
that normally floated to Palmer's operation. This diversion
created debris that affected Palmer's operation. In his complaint,
Palmer claimed first possession and first use, citing the fact that
he arrived first and was the first to build a dam. Historically,
Palmer's claims were the type of private property rights claims
that succeeded. The court, however, decided differently. The
court concluded that all riparian owners had a right to
correlative use of a stream, and that any one might impose costs
on another so long as the costs were small. What had been a
private right prescribed by use became common property.
Palmer influenced Justice Joseph Story's opinion in the 1827
federal case of Tyler v. Wilkinson," a case concerning a large
number of competing users of stream flow for motive power. In
Tyler, a number of mill owners located along the Pawtucket River
near Providence complained after an upstream diversion canal
was built that reduced downstream flow. Taking note of Palmer,
the Tyler court announced a new doctrine of reasonable use. The
court held that rights to water flow were common property held
66. Rose, supra note 23, at 293-94. There are other issues as well. Exclusive
riparian rights may not work effectively where there are interdependencies among
users. The "mushier" reasonable use doctrine turns out to be more efficient. See
Higgs, supra note 42, at 55 (giving details on how reasonable use maintained the
economic value of salmon fisheries for American Indians prior to the arrival of the
Europeans, who destroyed the fishery by using appropriative rights).
67. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
68. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
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by any and all riparians, entitling each user to make reasonable
use of the flowing asset.
6 9
This account of evolving water law, technology, and rules of
property tells us about demand for two fundamental traits of
water supply- water quantity and water quality. The technology
for rationing quantity is far simpler than that for quality, which
itself is multidimensional. When water use involves common
pools and large numbers of simultaneous users, the definition
and enforcement of water quality rights becomes even more
complicated. The evolving pattern of law that addresses these
issues is described in Figure 2. Where the number of water
quantity users is small, individualized private property rights
seem to emerge without difficulty. When the number of users is
large and the users draw from a common pool, common property
with rules for sharing emerges. Community water systems with
membership and user fees arise. When water quality is the trait
under consideration, however, common property seems to
develop, regardless of the size of the user group. River basin
associations and other firm-like approaches emerge to "own" and
manage the common property.
FIGURE 2
PROPERTY RULE VARIATIONS
Small Numbers Large Numbers
Water Quantity Private Rights Common Property
Water Quality Common Property Common Property
Figure 2 suggests that, for water property rights, two kinds
of technologies are needed to reduce the cost of moving from
common to private property arrangements. The first type of
necessary technology relates to transaction costs in the large
numbers case. If new technologies are developed that
successfully reduce the cost of communicating and negotiating
agreements, then private property rights can be defined for water
quantity irrespective of group size. A different type of technology
is needed to resolve the water quality problems. If the pattern of
costs imposed by particular dischargers can be measured and
monitored at low cost, then private rights and markets can
evolve when both small numbers and large numbers of users are
69. Id.
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involved. A review of some court decisions and regulatory actions
will illustrate how science and technology assisted these
changes.
2. Science and the Cost of Defining and Defending
As the pace of eastern industrial development quickened and
the locations for water-driven mills became filled, pollution
became a more serious problem than water supply.
Theoretically, riparian rights70  would protect downstream
occupiers of property from having their water rights degraded by
upstream dischargers.7' If an upstream discharger imposed costs
on a downstream party, the damaged party had a cause of action
at common law. The remedy was payment of damages and
injunctive relief. To succeed in court, the plaintiff had to show
evidence of harm caused by the defendant. The common law
acted as a legal fence around the property rights of downstream
landowners. This placed the burden of building a physical fence
to protect riparian right holders on the upstream discharger. The
polluter could either develop a technological fix, contract around
the rule, or violate the property rights of downstream users and
face the consequences. Scientific knowledge about pollution- its
source, how to measure it, and how to fence it in- heavily
influenced the economic calculus involved in selecting the logical
option.
The discovery of germ theory in the 1890s led to the rise of
an early U.S. environmental movement calling for the use of
science to manage water quality.72 Before this breakthrough,
there was a vague recognition that human health was related to
water quality, but the exact linkages were not understood. With
germ theory established, the Massachusetts Board of Health
70. "Riparian rights" are water rights that are allocated based on ownership of
land adjacent to water bodies. The riparian system is the dominant system of water
rights east of the Mississippi River. West of the Mississippi River, many states rely on
the "prior appropriation" system, which allocates water according to the order on
which users first claimed and used the water. See Rose, supra note 23, for a more
detailed discussion.
71. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modem
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923 (1999) (providing a survey of
common law actions that reflect this legal theory); see also BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON
SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1998). For a survey of relevant
Canadian common law actions, see ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
DEFENCE OF NATURE (1995).
72. Roger E. Meiners, Stacie Thomas & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Common
Law, and Institutional Choice for Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
supra note 7, at 54, 66-67.
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soon discovered the relationship between sewage in rivers and
typhoid. Then, enhanced filtration technology developed to
eliminate the germs,73 making it possible for sewage producers to
protect the water quality property rights of downstream users.
At the time germ theory was developing, new state
regulations shielded industry from common law suits. In
essence, such firms enjoyed the protection of regulatory property
rights. The typical regulatory body in industrialized states wrote
technology-based standards for firms that discharged in rivers
and streams; these were applied to new sources.74 Established
industry continued to operate unabated. Downstream
landowners could do little to protect themselves. Existing
polluters enjoyed preemptive rights that could not be challenged.
Thus, in the absence of scientific evidence of harm, downstream
receivers of waste could not have their day in court. The new
scientific knowledge changed this balance of power and
emboldened citizens in protecting their common law rights.
Using germ theory, they were able to provide evidence of harmful
invasion of their riparian rights, and the new fltering technology
lowered the cost for common law judges to enforce a strict
property rule. With common law rights reestablished for
downstream parties, water quality users became members of a
closed system. To engage in activities that lowered the water
quality, a discharger had to first negotiate with downstream
holders of property rights. Scientific knowledge about the linkage
between waste, germs, and disease set in motion economic forces
that led to the development of improved pollution control
machinery and the reinforcement of riparian property rights.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Missouri v. Illinois,7 demonstrates
how new scientific knowledge affected common law decisions
and how this knowledge affected property rights protection. 76 The
case concerned the City of Chicago's pumping of raw sewage into
a canal, whose water eventually flowed into the Illinois River
and, allegedly, the Mississippi River.
73. Stacie Thomas, Water Quality Management and Property Rights: A Financial
Markets Test of Institutional Stability (unpublished working paper, Clemson Univ.
Dep't of Econ., 1999) (copy on file with authors).
74. For examples, see M. T. MALONEY & BRUCE YANDLE, BUILDING MARKETS FOR
TRADABLE POLLUTION RIGHTS IN WATER RIGHTS 283, 293-300 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1983).
75. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
76. Id.; see also Roger E. Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law
Alternative, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 269, 276-90
(Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
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The state of Missouri brought suit at common law against
Chicago, asserting that Chicago's sewage was the cause of
typhoid in St. Louis, where between 95 and 441 people died each
year from 1890 to 1903.11 In effect, the good people of Chicago
were charged with "grazing" on water quality that belonged to St.
Louis.
Among the difficult questions in the case was the matter of
causation. Could Chicago's use of a river cause typhoid in St.
Louis? Or was it possible that some other discharger of sewage,
closer to St. Louis, caused the harm? The property rights
question involved the status of downstream right holders, who at
common law held superior claims to property in the face of
upstream activities that caused water quality to deteriorate. The
scientific issue concerned the newly developed scientific
understanding of the typhoid bacillus. Could a Chicago bacillus
survive the 357 mile trip from Chicago to St. Louis? In the end,
the weight of scientific testimony and evidence supported
Chicago's contention of no harm78 and the case against Chicago
was dismissed. The matter with respect to dischargers located
closer to St. Louis remained open to investigation. Knowledge of
biological science sharpened the definition of property rights.
Another example of the early interaction of the courts with
science in generating pollution control technologies can be seen
in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.79 This 1907 Supreme Court
decision involved a public nuisance suit brought by the state of
Georgia against a copper mine and smelter located just across
the Georgia-Tennessee border. Georgia won its original suit
claiming that the smelter's emissions imposed costs on people
and property in Georgia, and the Court gave the smelter a
reasonable time to find a solution to the problem.80 In effect, the
Court ordered the smelter to either fence in its pollution or shut
down. Eight years later, the Georgia plaintiffs requested a
permanent injunction against the plant."' In response, the
defendants reported that they had installed new pollution control
equipment that reduced sulfur emissions by half.82 Instead of
granting an immediate injunction, the Court required the copper
company to cut back its production and secure the consulting
77. 200 U.S. at 523.
78. 200 U.S. at 522-23, 526.
79. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). For further
discussion of this case see YANDLE, supra note 71, at 102-03.
80. 206 U.S. at 239.




services of a Vanderbilt University engineer who resolved the
problem to the satisfaction of the Court and the plaintiff.8 3 Note
that the Court imposed no specific technology restrictions on the
firm; any technology was allowed so long as it accomplished the
goal. The common law process accommodated the discovery of a
tailor-made approach for protecting Georgia property rights.
With the rise of the U.S. industrial economy, scientific
knowledge of the linkage between human health and pollution
combined with common law actions to make a compelling case
for protection of environmental rights. By 1917, a number of
industrial states- Connecticut, Ohio, and Pennsylvania- had
state boards for controlling industrial wastes.84 By 1923, the
American Water Works Association could report that industrial
pollution had damaged some 248 water supplies in the U.S. and
Canada." Phenol discharge from coke works topped the list of
harmful pollutants.8 6 The combination of scientific evidence,
pressure from state health boards, and the very real threat of
science-based common law suits encouraged firms along the
Ohio River to join in a voluntary effort to reduce phenol
discharge into the Ohio River. Subsequently, technology for
removing phenol from wastewater was discovered and installed.
By 1929, practically every phenol discharger had elimination
devices at work. Fear of science-based common law suits partly
motivated this clean-up.
Donald Dewees reports a similar outcome in 1969 regarding
fifteen chlor-alkali plants that were discharging mercury to
Canadian rivers:
In the span of only three years the discharge of this pollutant
was reduced by 99 percent. Three public nuisance actions
were filed, and while none of these cases resulted in a
judgment.... the possibility of substantial liability, far in
excess of any fines that could have been imposed, induced
the firms to accelerate the abatement process beyond what
could have been achieved by regulation alone.8"
Notice that the common law's threat of strict liability inspired a
cooperative research effort to discover cost-effective pollution
83. See YANDLE, supra note 71, at 102-03.
84. Am. Water Works Ass'n, Progress Report of Industrial Wastes in Relation to
Water Supply, 10 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N. 415, 416 (1923).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Donald Dewees, Tort Law and the Deterrence of Environmental Pollution, in
INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILITY 139, 161 (T. H. Tietenberg ed., 1992).
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control. The fact that damages could be proved and sources
identified, even if only collectively, was enough to induce action.
Improvements in the science of hydrology made it possible
for common law judges to identify polluters who poached on the
property rights of downstream owners and made major
modifications in common law rules involving groundwater
pollution. In Wood v. Picillo,88 neighbors brought suit against a
farmer whose waste dump had allegedly contaminated their
drinking water. In holding for the plaintiffs, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court overturned a 1934 precedent that would have
favored the defendant.89 Noting improvements in the scientific
understanding of groundwater since 1934, the court held that
the flow of groundwater contaminants could now be predicted,
making it possible to provide strong property rights protection to
downstream parties.90
Changes in measurement costs also affect water quantity
rights. Transferability of water rights under New Mexico's prior
appropriation doctrine requires the state engineer to certify that
the transfer of consumptive use in terms of time or location does
not impair existing rights. 91 By statute, the state engineer is
required to hold a public hearing prior to making a
determination of transfer.92 As evidence of an open system, the
hearing provides all that claim to have an interest in maintaining
water flows an opportunity to state their concerns. When there
are controversies, which implies a reasonable likelihood of third-
party effects, the party receiving the transferred right to
consume water may be required to install wellhead metering
devices and report on usage.93 Only after approval does the
transfer become a private property rights matter between a
willing buyer and seller. During the approval process, the water
rights are common property waiting to be transformed by the
proceeding. When metering devices were lacking or costly, the
state engineer could rely only on records of the number of acres
of land assigned particular water flows. Then, calculations of
88. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).
89. Id. at 1248-49 (overturning Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I.
1934)).
90. Id. at 1249 ("Since this court decided Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp. in 1934,
the science of groundwater hydrology as well as societal concern for environmental
protection has developed dramatically.").
91. Ronald N. Johnson, Micha Gisser & Michael Werner, The Definition of a
Surface Water Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & EcON. 273, 284 (1981).
92. See N.M. Stat. Ann. 72-5-23, 72-5-4, 72-5-5 (1997) (requiring hearing if
requested by any party).
93. Johnson, Gisser & Wemer, supra note 91, at 283-87.
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acre-feet of stream flow could be compared with rough
measurements of amounts allocated. The technological
development of metering devices provided greater precision in
measuring actual use, which in turn reduced transaction costs,
thereby affecting quantity-based rights.
Indeed, technology can enable "new" property to be created.
Colorado Springs created a sophisticated water monitoring
system. By increasing the capabilities of its system, the city was
able to capture ownership of return flows of water into ground
water systems and then sell the rights to these flows to
downstream users.94 "Since these return flows would be almost
impossible to capture, the exchange agreements allow for these
rights to be fully utilized by exchanging them to a downstream
user."95 The city has also been able to economize on wastewater
treatment costs by selling non-potable return flows.
3. Property Rights Technology and Community Action
The community involved relates directly to the complexity of
property rights technology required and therefore to the
transaction costs involved. The cases discussed above, with the
exception of Tennessee Copper, involve a small number of
parties, making the development of private property rights more
likely. The transaction costs involved in such a development are
relatively small, and the technical challenge posed by identifying
cause, effect, and damages presented a low barrier for defining
and defending private property rights. On the other hand, where
the number of interested parties is large and the environmental
outcome is collectively determined, the property rights
technology problem becomes more complex and costly to resolve.
Where that is the case, history tells us that communities
organize around the resource in question, form a transaction
cost-minimizing virtual firm, and treat the environmental
resource as a managed asset. The firm's management then has
the responsibility of defining, defending, and transferring
property rights. Two well-known water quality stories illustrate
the point.
Heavy pollution in the Ruhr, Emscher, and Wupper rivers
and serious human health consequences in nineteenth century
Prussia led the government to define, defend, and allocate public
94. Robert B. Naeser & Mark G. Smith. Enforcing Property Rights in Western
Water: Is It Better to Be Upstream with a Shovel or Downstream with a Model?, in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 15.
95. Id.
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property rights in water quality for those three river basins. 96
Today, the water management organizations act with owner-like
concern as they build treatment plants, determine and collect
fees, manage parks and recreational areas, and produce and sell
drinking water. To the extent possible, the public sector
managers charge prices and manage environmental assets as
though they were private property.
Prior to building a facility that discharges into these waters,
the plant owner must provide scientific data on the water quality
effects of their discharge to the river basin association managers.
Then, the river basin managers take representative samples of
the discharge and run ecological tests using flora and fauna
from the rivers. Finally, the river basin associations have
geographic information systems that enable them to model the
effects of discharge on water quality at different points in the
system. Discharge fees are assessed on the basis of this
technical information.
97
At this point, the German associations are a partially closed
property rights system. The associations "own" certain specified
rights to rivers, manage the rights, and sell access to them by
collecting money and then granting access in various forms. The
associations maintain water quality and quantity constraints;
there is no apparent political meddling with respect to these. By
contrast, the other rivers in Germany are managed as an open
system and are controlled by statutes and regulation.
Environmental organizations and other special interest groups
have voice in determining outcomes, and polluters hold
regulatory property rights that enable them to limit competitive
entry.98 Property rights technology has emerged in the
association-run water quality systems, but has not emerged in
the government regulated systems.
A similar story can be told about the Ohio River and the
Ohio River Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO), the river
association that resulted from a 1948 multi-state compact for
96. See BLAIR T. BOWER ET AL., INCENTIVES IN WATER QUALrIY MANAGEMENT: FRANCE
AND THE RUHR AREA (1981).
97. Id.
98. There are no formal property rights in the sense of pieces of paper and a
registry, as there is for land. This is our point. Implicit property rights emerge when
environmental groups are able to obtain restrictions, which they enforce through
lawsuits, and industrialists gain revenue from the enforcement action's effects, and
so indirectly support it. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers, Baptists, and Global Warming
(PERC Policy Series Ps-14) (1998), available at http://www.perc.org/ps14.pdf.
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the purpose of restoring water quality to safe levels.99 The
stimulus that shifted property rights for the Ohio River came
when microbe carriers of gastroenteritis traveled upstream and
imposed costs on Pittsburgh and other upstream cities that had
routinely discharged untreated human waste into the river. In an
interesting way, Cincinnati got revenge. With the compact in
place, the Ohio River ceased being a commons and became
subject to a system of public property rights managed by a
multi-state river basin association, ORSANCO.'" With many
dischargers along the path of the Ohio, water quality at any
given point was a collective result. To bring transaction costs to
manageable proportions, the river had to be organized as a firm,
and the firm had to develop the technology to defie and defend
its asset.
ORSANCO did this by developing a system of continuous
water quality monitoring with data transmitted to its Cincinnati
headquarters. This new technology could scan and measure a
number of individual water quality parameters, and reduced the
unit testing cost to 7.5 cents. In contrast, the older technique
cost $2.20 per test.'0 With monitoring costs reduced, the
association then imposed custom-tailored cleanup standards on
dischargers in the basin. Water quality and public health
improved. ORANSCO's primitive water quality monitoring system
served as "barbed wire" in protecting water quality in the Ohio
River.
B. Market-like Regulatory Property Rights
At times, prospects for gains from trade become so large that
market-like regulatory approaches begin to emerge. Two of the
best known examples are the lead and SO2 tradeable permit
systems created by the Clean Air Act. The lead program,
designed to cut the cost of the phase out of leaded gasoline, is
estimated to have saved regulated entities $228 million, 02 and
99. See EDWARD J. CLEARY. THE ORSANCO STORY (1967); M. T. Maloney & Bruce
Yandle, Building Markets for Tradable Pollution Rights, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE
RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 283 (Terry L. Anderson
ed., 1983). In fact, the Ohio and Ruhr Rivers share similar histories, Both are major
industrial rivers located in coal and steel territories, and both experienced serious
degradation from the discharge of human waste.
100. See generally Cleary, supra note 99. Note that Cleary does not refer to
property rights directly in telling the ORSANCO story- that is our interpretation of
the events that transpired.
101. CLEARY, supra note 99, at 210.
102. Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 102 (1989).
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the ongoing SO2 tradeable permit program is estimated to save
between $1 billion and $2 billion annually. 03 The U.S.
experience with its regulation-induced air pollution permit
markets illustrates a situation where regulatory property rights
technology could be transferred to a private property rights
regime if there were demand for the resources independent of the
regulation itself.
In the development of federal air pollution control,
command-and-control regulation supplemented and supplanted
common law property rights protection. At common law, either a
damaged owner or occupier of land or an entire community
could bring a nuisance suit against a polluter or negotiate with
the polluter to receive compensation for damages. The ability to
define and defend property rights was driven by market forces
and the law of private property rights. By contrast, a marketable
permit regime imposes emission standards that require polluters
to reduce either their own or someone else's equivalent
emissions by a stipulated amount. Once the collective constraint
is met, individual dischargers can generate a tradeable asset by
reducing emissions beyond the amount stipulated. But while the
regulatory property rights in the form of marketable emission
allowances facilitate trade among certified members of the
regulated community, the value of the permits is determined
strictly by the opportunity cost of pollution control. Since the
opportunity cost is determined by government imposed
specification standards, it is regulation, and only regulation, that
causes the right to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide or a milligram
of phosphate loading to have value. Regulation induces scarcity
and determines the potential for gains from trade, but the
utilitarian basis for the value is uncertain at best. Nonetheless,
these programs offer a path for privatization of regulatory
property rights, which we contend is their primary importance
rather than the potential for reducing the costs of regulation.
Consider, for example, California's south coast where the
South Coast Air Quality Management District asserts that "15
million people breathe some of the dirtiest air in the U.S.""c This
region offers the most prominent example of the emergence of air
pollution control markets. Under California law, participants in
marketable permit markets must have continuous emission
103. Dallas Burtaw, 7)ading Emissions to Clean the Air: Exchanges Few but
Savings Many, 122 RESOURCES 3. 5 (1996).




monitoring capability and report emissions data that can be
audited.' If a firm reduces emissions by more than the required
amount, the firm can record and "bank" its regulatory gains with
the authorities and receive a "deed" for the reductions; the deed
is a transferable asset.' California's regulatory property rights
system has generated private property rights technologies for
managing air quality. Moreover, it has created incentives to
develop the physical world technologies needed to create private
property rights solutions. All that remains is to generate the legal
technology necessary for privatization. In spite of the heavy layer
of regulatory property, the path to private property rights has
become clearer.
The EPA's controversial Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)'0°
program for water pollution also gives an example of how
regulatory property programs can contain the seeds of private
property solutions. As part of an initiative to clean up rivers
nationwide, EPA proposes allowing pollutant credit trading
programs.' EPA hopes that by focusing on water quality
outcomes rather than pollution emissions, environmental fences
will be erected and that rapid gains in monitoring technology will
reduce the cost of building the proposed environmental fences.
This plan is supplemented by EPA's improved system for
simulating the effects of discharge on water quality, which now
allows the property rights protector to estimate the marginal
effects of individual polluters on ambient stream conditions. In
spite of the heavy layer of regulatory property, the path to private
property rights has become clearer.
IV
COMPETING PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVIDERS
There is still a missing piece to this story. Let us return to
the impact legal technology has on the development of property
rights to address the tragedy of the commons. In Anglo-American
105. See Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's
Dirtiest Air? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District's Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359, 402-05 (1995).
106. See South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 301, available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/r30lpartl.html.
107. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,469
(describing TMDL program); Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Roger E. Meiners,
The Failure of EPA's Water Quality Reforms: From Environment-Enhancing
Competition to Uniformity and Pollution Profits (2001) (unpublished manuscript on
file with authors) (describing and criticizing TMDL program).
108. See Susan Mclnerney, Environment: Clinton Unveils New Steps for Protecting
U.S. Waterways, BNA WASH. INSIDER, Aug. 16, 1999, at D2.
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law there are two such technologies: common law and statute
law.109 These are not simply different sets of rules but different
technologies for generating rules. Libertarian scholars such as
Epstein, 10 Hayek,"' and Leoni I12 describe stark differences
between statutes written by politicians and law discovered by
common law judges.
The common law is a process based on the resolution of
disputes between parties by a judge and jury. Rules arise from
the classification of facts and in response to the nature of the
problems parties bring to court. Particularly in a country like the
United States with a multiplicity of jurisdictions, innovations
spread relatively slowly and through a decentralized system of
persuasive precedent. Judges are generally unable to seek
particular types of cases to advance their own agendas.11 Even
when a case arises that offers a judge the opportunity to advance
her own political agenda, she must persuade her colleagues at
the appellate level to follow her views.
Statutory law, on the other hand, results from a political
process. Public choice theory has made clear the structural
109. Civil law countries have a third, the code system, which differs from
statutory law by requiring consistency and generality of principles.
110. Richard Epstein describes the differences this way:
The allocative effects of choices between common law rules are, in any
event, often small in comparison to what is accomplished by direct
government action. Statutory controls can utilize a range of sanctions that
are unavailable at common law: taxes, fines, inspections, filing
requirements, and specific bans and orders with wide and dramatic effects.
Even so simple a matter as placing limitation periods on private actions
requires a statute; no common law principle explains why a cause of action
valid on one day should be barred the next. Private law remedies are a
limited arsenal in comparison; the private law of nuisance and the Clean Air
Act are very different modes of social control.
Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1717, 1721 (1982). Oddly enough, legal historian A. W. Brian Simpson does not see
the difference between the rule of politics and the rule of law. He takes issue with
Coase on this very point, saying that Coase's preference for common law over
legislation reflects a controversial view. See A. W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou
Reexamined, 25 J.L. & EcON. 53-101 (1996). Having made this point, Simpson
proceeds to weaken his own case by noting that parties can contract around common
law rules, but cannot contract around statutes.
111. HAYEK, supra note 54, at 141-43.
112. LEONI, supra note 54, at I10-11.
113. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1377, 1391-92 (1998) (summarizing literature on public choice and the
Judiciary); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation
of Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1990), Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT.
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reasons why the legislative process is frequently captured by
special interests: the concentration of the benefits of controlling
the creation of regulatory property rights and the diffuse nature
of the costs of these rights.'14 The record is clear that this
phenomenon has been present in federal environmental
legislation from the beginning. 
1 5
What is important for our purposes is how statutory and
common law compete as property rights providers. After all,
property rights generate appropriable wealth that property right
providers may wish to share in. Ideally, common law courts will
not be productive venues for industry cartelization and rent-
seeking, ills that generally plague environmental regulatory
efforts. 16 However, we obviously do not live in an ideal world-
we live in a world of competing institutions that seek the
patronage of special interest groups. If common law protection of
property rights becomes too rigid or burdensome, special interest
groups can, and do, turn to legislative bodies for relief."' This
was the case even in the heyday of the English common law
system, when common law judges dealt with environmental
harms and property rights." 8 The history of the landmark case
Rylands v. Fletcher"9 illustrates the point. In recounting the
114. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE I (1989).
115. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 57; E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 313 (1985); Andrew P. Morriss. The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLrTCAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
116. Yet while rent-seeking behavior may not rule the day successfully in common
law courts. Horwltz and Friedman argue that those same courts, in some early
version of conscious parallelism, systematically favored industry during periods of
industrial development. See MORTON HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw (2d ed. 1985).
But in an examination of every nineteenth century tort case recorded for California
and New Hampshire, Gary Schwartz found no evidence of the Horowitz-Friedman
effect. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 8 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981). With the exception of employment law,
Schwartz's findings go the other way: common law courts seemed to favor farmers,
consumers, small businesses, and ordinary people as plaintiffs against large firm
defendants. These findings, however, do not prove that there is no rent seeking in
courts of law. Surely there is, since many if not all tort actions are motivated by
efforts to recover or obtain some rents. But actions taken by a plaintiff or group of
plaintiffs to seek rents by bringing suit is an entirely different social phenomenon
from systematic efforts exerted by organized interest groups to raise rivals' costs or
permanently cartelize a market through the legislative process.
117. See Jason Scott Johnston, On the Commons and the Common Law, in THE
COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 7, at 211.
118. See A. W. B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical
Context ofRylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1984).
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facts of the case, legal historian A. W. Brian Simpson explains
that matters involving natural resources were routinely handled
by special bills in Parliament, also referred to as Local and
Personal Statutes. Simpson tells the rent-seeking story this way:
The industrial and agricultural revolution[s] of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries were accompanied by the
development of new bodies of law and the invention of new
legal regimes; the typical instrument employed in this process
was the private act of Parliament promoted by advocates of
change and development, who hoped to profit by it .... The
number of such acts passed was very considerable indeed,
reaching a peak in 1846, when 402 were passed, in contrast
to a mere 170 public acts; in the 1860s the annual figure
fluctuated between 159 in 1869 and 372 in 1865.120
Matters covered by this form of specialized legislation included
tramways, tunnels, canals, harbors, docks, sanitation, burial
grounds, waterworks, and water for consumption, industrial use,
or water power. 121 Simpson indicates there were two reasons for
the private acts, one being "the need to override private property
rights" and the other the "desire to produce conditions of
monopoly." 122 Later, the same thing would be said about the rise
of U.S. administrative law as indicated by the outpouring of new
rules in the Federal Register.'23
Unlike competing providers of consumer goods, courts and
legislatures do not offer alternative products on store shelves.
These institutions compete nonetheless- legislators hold public
hearings to signal their interest in solving problems through
legislation, and attorneys, if not judges, advertise that they can
resolve problems through the courts. Legislatures' broad
surveys, ability to act proactively, and greater resources gives
statutory law a competitive advantage in defining solutions to
common problems. Because legislatures can shift some or all of
the costs of solutions onto underrepresented third parties,
statutory solutions may also offer more attractive rent-seeking
opportunities than do courts. We should not be surprised,
therefore, to see statutory solutions dominate in areas where
there are gains to be had from rent seeking and the creation of
regulatory property rights. The interesting question will thus
120. Simpson, supra note 118, at 252.
121. Id.at252-53.
122. Id. at 253.
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often be whether the path to the creation of regulatory property
rights is a one way street. Once sticks in the bundle have been
created as regulatory property, can they be transformed into
private property rights? This is not simply a matter of relabelling
rights. Recall from our earlier discussion that a key distinction
between regulatory and private property rights bundles is the
incentive created to develop new legal and physical world
technologies to permit trade of the rights within the bundle and
to create new rights in the bundle.
The transformation is not impossible- our discussion of
market-like regulatory property rights in Part III above shows
that when sufficiently large gains from trade exist, regulatory
property rights owners will seek to create means of capturing
those gains. The use of market-like mechanisms will in turn
create both incentives to privatize the resulting regulatory
property rights and incentives to create the technologies
necessary to do so. Saying something is possible if enough
money is on the table is not particularly helpful, however. Can
we say more?
Emphatically, yes. By focusing on getting the incentives right
and setting distributional concerns aside, our analysis suggests
that a clear path to procuring the potential gains from trade that
private property rights make possible for society, if not for
particular individuals is created. The key is to encourage
entrepreneurs by offering them opportunities to profit by
defining new property rights "sticks" and creating the ability to
trade them. Allowing entrepreneurs to homestead bundles of
such potential rights creates such incentives and can be
accomplished within the statutory framework in many instances.
The public choice theory concerns will now encourage the
definition of such bundles through legislation, since special
interests can grab first-mover advantages in the resulting "land
rush" to stake claims.
The distribution of the new property rights will undoubtedly
be more skewed toward the wealthy than it would be under the
common law, because we will, in effect, be bribing special
interest groups to rely on private property rather than regulatory
property, and because money has always had greater influence
in politics than in law. Nonetheless, this may be the price we
have to pay to secure the benefits of private property technology.
In addition, these distributional impacts are mitigated by the
greater future wealth created by allowing appropriation. As
David Schmidtz points out, contemporary Americans are far
better off than were the original appropriators in the Jamestown
[Vol. 28:123
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This analysis of how competing legal processes can
accommodate and encourage flows of private property rights
technology describes a long journey that began with a commons
and ended with private property rights. Along the way, we
developed a theory about the division of property rights and
applied it to environmental resources. Building on the demand
threshold model used by other property rights scholars, the
model developed in this Article emphasized the development of
property rights technology as a transaction cost reducing
mechanism. After tracing the development of property rights to
U.S. environmental resources through common law and
regulation, we end with the conclusion that the gap between
regulatory and private property rights enlarges and contracts as
technologies enter and overwhelm rent-seeking forces that stand
in the way of the development of new markets for environmental
resources.
Analyzing the evolution of solutions to tragedies of the
commons in terms of technological change offers the potential
for a number of insights. Regulatory property solutions differ in
their impact on future technological change. Some solutions,
such as tying a right to emit to use of a specific technology,
effectively eliminate the incentives necessary to produce the new
technologies necessary for the evolution of private property
solutions. Others, like tradeable emissions permits, offer a path
into private property rights solution by creating incentives for
technological innovation. In situations where private property
rights solutions are unavailable or politically impossible, the
form of regulatory property chosen may make the difference
between a low-level equilibrium trap with large dead-weight
losses and eventually being able to take advantage of the gains
from trade private property rights make possible. Through
appropriate institutional choices, we can unleash the creative
power of countless individuals on tragedies of the commons,
discovering solutions we cannot now imagine. Although we
cannot predict the ultimate path of technological change, we can
124. David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
supra note 7, at 109, 112.
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safely say that such a path is preferable to the dead end offered
by some forms of regulatory property.
A second important insight concerns the institutions that
implement the solutions to the tragedy. Evolutionary institutions
are critical to capturing the potential gains from trade. Private
property rights have a clear advantage over regulatory property
in this regard, but steps can be taken to bring regulatory
property solutions closer to the private property model. Avoiding
fixed mandates and focusing on outcomes and adjudicatory
procedures offer a way to make regulatory property solutions
more adaptable. We must remember that legal institutions are
themselves technology and can evolve in response to incentives.
A third conclusion developed in this Article is that solutions
to the tragedy of the commons need not be fixed. Neither
regulatory nor private property solutions are ultimate
destinations but merely forms of institutions that can change in
response to incentives and circumstances. An escape from the
tragedy is never final, but always preliminary and tentative. In
some respects, the difference between a common law nuisance
rule and the Clean Water Act is only the degree of potential gains
from trade necessary to produce change.
In sum, the technologies of property rights offers a
framework for analysis of solutions to tragedies of the commons
that clarifies institutional choices across a wide range of
problems. Further work is necessary to identify the specific
factors that lead to particular forms of property rights.
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